ABOUT: This is where I will be sharing content regarding national security issues. I am especially focused on nuclear security problems and major geopolitical confrontations.
RELATED: Essays and Reading, Military and Nat'l Security Books
08/04/2024
I've finally finished (after an accidental hiatus) a project I started about a month and a half ago. This is meant to be a detailed, but not comprehensive, look at the current state of the US nonstrategic nuclear arsenal. These weapons are gaining more and more importance as the US, Russia, and China navigate this new tripolar moment of nuclear instability. The likelihood of a full on nuclear exchange like that reminiscent of 1980s Cold War nuclear planning is slim, but the prospect of nonstrategic (a.k.a. tactical) nuclear weapons being used in a crisis is higher than any time in the last 30 years. This can be seen immediately with the surge of press coverage about the potential for nuclear weapons use during 2022 as Putin's invasion of Ukraine was in a highly dynamic and uncertain stage. This presentation is meant to shed more light on the current capabilites the US has (and will have) to respond to tactical nuclear weapons use proportionally. It's meant to have an accompanying video presentation, which I have yet to record, but when I do it can be found here.
07/31/2024
What follows is a combination of summary and commentary on the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. I'd printed this off way back when it was published, but I didn't make time to read and annotate it until after I graduated. So, in early June 2024 I finally got around to reading it and have a few comments/observations here and there. I by no means have any formal national security expertise, but am simply interested in the field, so take all that I say with a grain of salt. I'm hoping that as I build my career in the nuclear security world I can have something valuable to provide to the US nuclear enterprise. I have embedded the text of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review below for ease of reading (it starts on pg. 37 of the PDF, pg. 25 of the document). I realize these embedded PDFs may not work on mobile devices, so you can also find the document here.
Preliminaries
The Nuclear Posture Review is a document published by the executive branch, specifically the Department of Defense, under direction from the administration, and required by Congress, to detail how the administration intends to use, or not use, nuclear weapons in conjunction with US national security interests (as well as those of our allies and global partners). The document comes out at the halfway point of the administration's tenure with the previous one being published by the Trump administration in 2018. The Biden administration published the National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, and Missile Defense Review all as one document in 2022, which can be read in it's entirety above. The following discussion/notes will focus solely on the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
I. A COMPREHENSIVE, BALANCED APPROACH...
This section starts off immediately by reaffirming the United States' committment to providing its allies with deterrence benefits through various security agreements. This is what is often referred to as the "nuclear umbrella," protecting allies in the Pacific like South Korea and Japan, and European allies in NATO. The document underscores the importance of nuclear weapons to US security saying in the opening paragraph, "strategic deterrence remains a top priority mission for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Nation." Acknowledging the strained security environment, the NPR restates the US committment to non-proliferation and arms control agreements. This seems to me to be an extension of an olive branch to any nuclear nation (or emerging nuclear states) to come to the table with the US and pursue non-proliferation, even if that seems highly unlikely at this moment. It came off as the administration covering their bases on the diplomatic front while focusing on investing heavily in the modernization of the arsenal (which we will get to).
The NPR then goes on to state the lofty sentiment that the US still hopes to acheive a global peace where nuclear weapons can be completely abolished. The next part admittedly made me role my eyes a little bit, since the sentiment is not really in line with reality. The 5 declared nuclear powers (US, UK, PRC, France, and Russia) all agreed to state that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought..." Now, I obviously do not encourage the use of nuclear weapons, but the discussions surrounding tactical nuclear weapons within the Pentagon and other nat'l security circles would certainly contradict this. The idea of prevailing in the event of deterrence failure would require that the US be prepared to wage a nuclear war and succeed, however success may be measured in nuclear warfare. This is a bit of a tangent, but I hope to create an entry discussing the misconceptions and overestimation of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons. I personally take the stance that a nuclear war should never be fought, but that the US can and should win in the event that deterrence fails.
In this vein, the NPR stated that the modernization of nuclear forces and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems will continue. To better support the National Defense Strategy, the NPR states that certain unnecessary/redundant capabilities will be retired or no longer pursued. This includes the retirement of the B83-1 gravity bomb (the only weapon currently in the active US nuclear arsenal with a yield >1 megaton) and the cancellation of the nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) program. The latter would not actually pan out, as Congress has funded the SLCM-N in the 2024 NDAA and directed the administration to produce an operational capability by 2034. The text also stressed that nuclear weapons will play an important role in the idea of "integrated deterrence," which is a new policy outlined by the National Defense Strategy. Essentially, integrated deterrence is about using all available assets to deter specific competitors under certain scenarios. So, if the US were intending on deterring China in the South China Sea (we are), then the simple presence of strategic nuclear weapons on ICBMs in the US Heartland would not constitute integrated deterrence. An integrated deterrence approach would be a plan to employ many assets together to keep China at bay, perhaps relying on regional allies and partners as well. For example, offensive cyber capabilities could deny China intelligence or communications in the area, a responsive and potent conventional presence of naval and marine assets could greatly increase the cost of engaging in conflict, capable intelligence assets could keep the US one step ahead of China, and low-yield nuclear warheads deployed on sea-based cruise missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could lower the threshhold for nuclear use and allow the US to engage in more convincing brinkmanship. All of these pieces play their own role in reducing the enemy's ability to acheive its goals or operate in the environment and together they leave the enemy political leadership with significantly less leverage on the international stage. Perhaps this could be its own essay elsewhere.
Finally for this section, one of the most exciting parts of this policy (that I think I have seen the results of in my own life) is the push for a strengthened nuclear enterprise at home. The NPR states this best: "We will sustain and strengthen activities to recruit, retain, and support the professional development of Service members and civilians working in and supporting the nuclear field." I am looking forward to what these new possibilities will mean for my professional future in the nuclear security sector.
II. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND DETERRENCE CHALLENGES
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